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Abstract
Security issues are crucial in a number of machine learning applications, especially in
scenarios dealing with human activity rather than natural phenomena (e.g., information
ranking, spam detection, malware detection, etc.). It is to be expected in such cases that
learning algorithms will have to deal with manipulated data aimed at hampering decision
making. Although some previous work addressed the handling of malicious data in the
context of supervised learning, very little is known about the behavior of anomaly detection
methods in such scenarios. In this contribution,1 we analyze the performance of a particular
method – online centroid anomaly detection – in the presence of adversarial noise. Our
analysis addresses the following security-related issues: formalization of learning and attack
processes, derivation of an optimal attack, analysis of its efficiency and constraints. We
derive bounds on the effectiveness of a poisoning attack against centroid anomaly under
different conditions: bounded and unbounded percentage of traffic, and bounded false
positive rate. Our bounds show that whereas a poisoning attack can be effectively staged
in the unconstrained case, it can be made arbitrarily difficult (a strict upper bound on
the attacker’s gain) if external constraints are properly used. Our experimental evaluation
carried out on real HTTP and exploit traces confirms the tightness of our theoretical bounds
and practicality of our protection mechanisms.
1. Introduction
Machine learning methods have been instrumental in enabling numerous novel data analysis
applications. Currently indispensable technologies such as object recognition, user prefer-
ence analysis, spam filtering – to name only a few – all rely on accurate analysis of massive
amounts of data. Unfortunately, the increasing use of machine learning methods brings
about a threat of their abuse. A convincing example of this phenomenon are emails that
bypass spam protection tools. Abuse of machine learning can take on various forms. A
∗. Also at Machine Learning Group, Technische Universitt Berlin, Franklinstr. 28/29, FR 6-9, 10587 Berlin,
Germany.
1. A preliminary version of this paper appears in AISTATS 2010, JMLR Workshop and Conference Pro-
ceedings, 2010.
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malicious party may affect the training data, for example, when it is gathered from a real
operation of a system and cannot be manually verified. Another possibility is to manip-
ulate objects observed by a deployed learning system so as to bias its decisions in favor
of an attacker. Yet another way to defeat a learning system is to send a large amount of
nonsense data in order to produce an unacceptable number of false alarms and hence force
a system’s operator to turn it off. Manipulation of a learning system may thus range from
simple cheating to complete disruption of its operations.
A potential insecurity of machine learning methods stems from the fact that they are
usually not designed with adversarial input in mind. Starting from the mainstream compu-
tational learning theory (Vapnik, 1998; Scho¨lkopf and Smola, 2002), a prevalent assumption
is that training and test data are generated from the same, fixed but unknown, probabil-
ity distribution. This assumption obviously does not hold for adversarial scenarios. Fur-
thermore, even the recent work on learning with differing training and test distributions
(Sugiyama et al., 2007) is not necessarily appropriate for adversarial input, as in the latter
case one must account for a specific worst-case difference.
The most important application field in which robustness of learning algorithms against
adversarial input is crucial is computer security. Modern security infrastructures are facing
an increasing professionalization of attacks motivated by monetary profit. A wide-scale
deployment of insidious evasion techniques, such as encryption, obfuscation and polymor-
phism, is manifested in an exploding diversity of malicious software observed by security
experts. Machine learning methods offer a powerful tool to counter a rapid evolution of
security threats. For example, anomaly detection can identify unusual events that poten-
tially contain novel, previously unseen exploits (Wang and Stolfo, 2004; Rieck and Laskov,
2006; Wang et al., 2006; Rieck and Laskov, 2007). Another typical application of learning
methods is automatic signature generation which drastically reduces the time needed for
a production and deployment of attack signatures (Newsome et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006).
Machine learning methods can also help researchers to better understand the design of mali-
cious software by using classification or clustering techniques together with special malware
acquisition and monitoring tools (Bailey et al., 2007; Rieck et al., 2008).
In order for machine learning methods to be successful in security applications – and
in general in any application where adversarial input may be encountered – they should
be equipped with countermeasures against potential attacks. The current understanding
of security properties of learning algorithms is rather patchy. Earlier work in the PAC-
framework has addressed some scenarios in which training data is deliberately corrupt
(Angluin and Laird, 1988; Littlestone, 1988; Kearns and Li, 1993; Auer, 1997; Bschouty
et al., 1999). These results, however, are not connected to modern learning algorithms used
in classification, regression and anomaly detection problems. On the other hand, several
examples of effective attacks have been demonstrated in the context of specific security and
spam detection applications (Lowd and Meek, 2005a; Fogla et al., 2006; Fogla and Lee, 2006;
Perdisci et al., 2006; Newsome et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2008), which has motivated a recent
work on taxonomization of such attacks (Barreno et al., 2006, 2008). However, it remains
largely unclear whether machine learning methods can be protected against adversarial
impact.
We believe that an unequivocal answer to the problem of “security of machine learning”
does not exist. The security properties cannot be established experimentally, as the notion
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of security deals with events that do not just happen on average but rather only potentially
may happen. Hence, a theoretical analysis of machine learning algorithms for adversarial
scenarios is indispensable. It is hard to imagine, however, that such analysis can offer
meaningful results for any attack and any circumstances. Hence, to be a useful guide for
practical applications of machine learning in adversarial environments, such analysis must
address specific attacks against specific learning algorithms. This is precisely the approach
followed in this contribution.
The main focus of our work is a security analysis of online centroid anomaly detection
against the so-called “poisoning” attacks. The centroid anomaly detection is a very simple
method which has been widely used in computer security applications (e.g., Forrest et al.,
1996; Warrender et al., 1999; Wang and Stolfo, 2004; Rieck and Laskov, 2006; Wang et al.,
2006; Rieck and Laskov, 2007). In the learning phase, centroid anomaly detection computes
the mean of all training data points:
c =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi.
Detection is carried out by computing the distance of a new example x from the centroid c
and comparing it with an appropriate threshold:
f(x) =
{
1, if ||x− c|| > θ
0, otherwise.
Notice that all operations can be carried out using kernel functions – a standard trick known
since the kernel PCA (Scho¨lkopf et al., 1998; Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini, 2004) – which
substantially increases the discriminative power of this method.
More often than not, anomaly detection algorithms are deployed in non-stationary en-
vironments, hence need to be regularly re-trained. In the extreme case, an algorithm learns
online by updating its hypothesis after every data point it has received. Since the data is fed
into the learning phase without any verification, this opens a possibility for an adversary to
force a learning algorithm to learn a representation suitable for an attacker. One particular
kind of attack is the so-called “poisoning” in which specially crafted data points are injected
so as to cause a hypothesis function to misclassify a given malicious point as benign. This
attack makes sense when an attacker does not have “write” permission to the training data,
hence cannot manipulate it directly. Therefore, his goal is to trick an algorithm by merely
using an “append” permission, by sending new data.
The poisoning attack against online centroid anomaly detection has been considered by
Nelson and Joseph (2006) for the case of infinite window, i.e., when a learning algorithm
memorizes all data seen so far. Their main result was surprisingly optimistic: it was shown
that the number of attack data points to be injected grows exponentially as a function
of the impact over a learned hypothesis. However, the assumption of an infinite window
also hinders the ability of a learning algorithm to adjust to legitimate changes in the data
distribution.
As a main contribution of this work, we present the security analysis of online centroid
anomaly detection for the finite window case, i.e., when only a fixed number of data points
can be used at any time to form a hypothesis. We show that, in this case, an attacker
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can easily compromise a learning algorithm by using only a linear amount of injected data
unless additional constraints are imposed. As a further contribution, we analyze the algo-
rithm under two additional constraints on the attacker’s part: (a) the fraction of the traffic
controlled by an attacker is bounded by ν, and (b) the false positive rate induced by an at-
tack is bounded by α. Both of such constraints can be motivated by an operational practice
of anomaly detection systems. Overall, we significantly extend the analysis of Nelson and
Joseph (2006) by considering a more realistic learning scenario, explicitly treating potential
constraints on the attacker’s part and providing tighter bounds.
The methodology of our analysis follows the following framework, which we believe can
be used for a quantitative security analysis of learning algorithms (Laskov and Kloft, 2009):
1. Axiomatic formalization of the learning and attack processes. The first step in the
analysis is to formally specify the learning and attack processes. Such formalization
includes definitions of data sources and objective (risk) functions used by each party,
as well as the attack goal. It specifies the knowledge available to an attacker, i.e.,
whether he knows an algorithm, its parameters and internal state, and which data he
can potentially manipulate.
2. Specification of an attacker’s constraints. Potential constraints on the attacker’s part
may include: percentage of traffic under his control, amount of additional data to
be injected, an upper bound on the norm of manipulated part, a maximal allowable
false-positive rate (in case an attack must stealthy), etc. Such constraints must be
incorporated into the axiomatic formalization.
3. Investigation of an optimal attack policy. Given a formal description of the problem
and constraints, an optimal attack policy must be investigated. Such policy may
be long-term, i.e., over multiple attack iteration, as well as short-term, for a single
iteration. Investigation can be carried out either as a formal proof or numerically, by
casting the search for an attack policy as an optimization problem.
4. Bounding of an attacker’s gain under an optimal policy. The ultimate goal of our
analysis is to quantify an attacker’s gain or effort under his optimal policy. Such
analysis may take different forms, for example calculation of the probability for an
attack to succeed, estimation of the required number of attack iterations, calculation
of the geometric impact of an attack (a shift towards an insecure state), etc.
Organization of this paper reflects the main steps of the proposed methodology. In a
preliminary Section 2 the models of the learning and the attack processes are introduced.
The analytical part is arranged in two sections as follows. Section 4 addresses the steps
(1), (3) and (4) under an assumption that an attacker has full control of the network
traffic. Section 5 introduces an additional assumption that attacker’s control is limited to
a certain fixed fraction of network traffic, as required in step (2). Another constraint of the
bounded false positive rate is considered in Section 6. This section also removes a somewhat
unrealistic assumption of Section 5 that all innocuous points are accepted by the algorithm.
The analytic results are experimentally verified in Section 7 on real HTTP data and attacks
used in intrusion detection systems. Some proofs and the auxiliary technical material are
presented in the Appendix.
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Before moving on to the detailed presentation of our analysis, it may be instructive
to discuss the place of a poisoning attack in the overall attack taxonomy and practical
implication of its assumptions. For two-class learning problems, attacks against learning
algorithms can be generally classified according to the following two criteria (the terminology
in the taxonomy of Barreno et al. (2006) is given in brackets):
• whether an attack is staged during the training (causative) or the deployment of an
algorithm (causative/exploratory), or
• whether an attack attempts to increase the false negative or the false positive rate at
the deployment stage (integrity/availability).
The poisoning attack addressed in our work can be classified as a causative integrity attack.
This scenario is quite natural, e.g., in web application scenarios in which the data on a server
can be assumed secure but the injection of adversarial data cannot be easily prevented.
Other common attack types are a mimicry attack – alteration of malicious data to resemble
innocuous data (an exploratory integrity attack), or a “red herring” attack – sending of
junk data that causes false alarms (an exploratory availability attack). Attacks of the latter
two kinds are beyond the scope of our investigation.
As a final remark, we must consider the extent to which the attacker is familiar with the
learning algorithm and trained model. One of the key principles of computer security, known
as Kerckhoff’s principle, is that the robustness of any security instrument must not depend
on keeping its operational functionality secret. Similar to modern cryptographic methods,
we must assume that the attacker knows which machine learning algorithm is deployed and
how it operates (he can even use machine learning to reverse engineer deployed classifiers,
as shown by Lowd and Meek (2005b)). A more serious difficulty on the attacker’s part may
be to get hold of the training data or of the particular learned model. In the case of anomaly
detection, it is relatively easy for an attacker to retrieve a learned model: it suffices to sniff
on the same application that is protected by an algorithm to get approximately the same
innocuous data the algorithm is trained on. Hence, we will assume that an attacker has
precise knowledge of the trained model at any time during the attack.
2. Learning and Attack Models
Before proceeding with the analysis, we first present the precise models of the learning and
the attack processes. Our focus on anomaly detection is motivated by its ability to detect
potentially novel attacks, a crucial demand of modern information security.
2.1 Centroid Anomaly Detection
Given the data set X = {x1, . . . ,xn}, the goal of anomaly detection (also often referred
to as “novelty detection”) is to determine whether an example x is unlikely to have been
generated by the same distribution as the set X. A natural way to perform anomaly
detection is to estimate a probability density function of the distribution from which the
set X was drawn and flag x as anomalous if it comes from a region with low density. In
general, however, density estimation is a difficult problem, especially in high dimensions.
A large amount of data is usually needed to reliably estimate the density in all regions of
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Figure 1: Illustration of the density level estimation using a centroid model with a non-
linear kernel.
the space. For anomaly detection, knowing the density in the entire space is superfluous, as
we are only interested in deciding whether a specific point falls into a “sparsely populated”
area. Hence several direct methods have been proposed for anomaly detection, e.g., one-
class SVM (Scho¨lkopf et al., 2001), support vector data description (SVDD) (Tax and Duin,
1999a,b), and density level set estimation (Polonik, 1995; Tsybakov, 1997; Steinwart et al.,
2005). A comprehensive survey of anomaly detection techniques can be found in Markou
and Singh (2003a,b).
In the centroid anomaly detection, a Euclidean distance from an empirical mean of the
data is used as a measure of anomality:
f(x) = ||x− 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi||.
If a hard decision is desired instead of a soft anomality score, the data point is considered
anomalous if its anomaly score exceeds a fixed threshold r.
Centroid anomaly detection can be seen as a special case for the SVDD with outlier
fraction η = 1 and of the Parzen window density estimator (Parzen, 1962) with the Gaussian
kernel function k(x,y) = 1√
2pi
exp(−12x · y). Despite its straightforwardness, a centroid
model can represent arbitrary complex density level sets using a kernel mapping (Scho¨lkopf
and Smola, 2002; Mu¨ller et al., 2001) (see Fig. 1).
It has been successfully used in a variety of anomaly detection applications such as
intrusion detection (Hofmeyr et al., 1998; Yeung and Chow, 2002; Laskov et al., 2004a;
Wang and Stolfo, 2004; Rieck and Laskov, 2006; Wang et al., 2006; Rieck and Laskov,
2007), wireless sensor networks (Rajasegarar et al., 2007) and jet engine vibration data
analysis (Nairac et al., 1999). It can be shown (cf. Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini (2004),
Section 4.1) that even in high-dimensional spaces induced by nonlinear feature maps, the
empirical estimator of the center of mass of the data is stable and the radius of a sphere
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anchored at the center of mass is related to a level set of the corresponding probability
density.
2.2 Online Anomaly Detection
The majority of anomaly detection applications have to deal with non-stationary data. This
is especially typical for computer security, as usually the processes being monitored change
over time: e.g., network traffic profile is strongly influenced by the time of the day and
system call sequences depend on the applications running on a computer. Hence the model
of normality constructed by anomaly detection algorithms usually needs to be updated
during their operations. In the extreme case, such an update can be performed after the
arrival of each data point resulting in the online operation. Obviously, re-training the model
from scratch every time is computationally infeasible; however, incorporation of new data
points and the removal of irrelevant ones can be done with acceptable effort (Laskov et al.,
2006).
For the centroid anomaly detection, re-calculation of the center of mass is straightfor-
ward and requires O(1) work. If all examples are “memorized”, i.e., the index n is growing
with the arrival of each example, the index n is incremented for every new data point, and
the update is computed as2
c′ =
(
1− 1
n
)
c +
1
n
x. (1)
For the finite horizon, i.e. constant n, some previous example xi is replaced by a new one,
and the update is performed as
c′ = c +
1
n
(x− xi). (2)
Various strategies can be used to determine the “least relevant” point xi to be removed
from a working set:
(a) oldest-out: The point with the oldest timestamp is removed.
(b) random-out: A randomly chosen point is removed.
(c) nearest-out: The nearest-neighbor of the new point x is removed.
(d) average-out: The center of mass is removed. The new center of mass is recalculated
as c′ = c + 1n(x− c), which is equivalent to Eq. (1) with constant n.
The strategies (a)–(c) require the storage of all points in the working set, whereas the
strategy (d) can be implemented by holding only the center of mass in memory.
2.3 Poisoning attack
The goal of a poisoning attack is to force an anomaly detection algorithm to accept an
attack point A that lies outside of the normal ball, i.e., ||A − c|| > r. It is assumed that
2. The update formula can be generalized to c′ = c + κ
n
(x − xi), with fixed κ ≥ 1. The bounds in the
analysis change only by a constant factor, which is negligible.
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Figure 2: Illustration of a poisoning attack. By iteratively inserting malicious training
points an attacker can gradually corrupt “drag” the centroid into a direction of
an attack.
an attacker knows the anomaly detection algorithm and all the training data. However, an
attacker cannot modify any existing data except for adding new points. These assumptions
model a scenario in which an attacker can sniff data on the way to a particular host and can
send his own data, while not having write access to that host. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the
poisoning attack attempts to inject specially crafted points that are accepted as innocuous
and push the center of mass in the direction of an attack point until the latter appears
innocuous.
What points should be used by an attacker in order to subvert online anomaly detection?
Intuitively one can expect that the optimal one-step displacement of the center of mass is
achieved by placing attack point xi at the line connecting c and A such that ||xi − c|| = r.
A formal proof of the optimality of such strategy and estimation of its efficiency constitutes
the main objective of security analysis of online anomaly detection.
In order to quantify the effectiveness of a poisoning attack, we define the i-th relative
displacement of the center of mass. This quantity measures the relative length of the
projection of ci onto the “attack direction” a in terms of the radius of the normality ball.
Definition 1 (Relative displacement)
(a) Let A be an attack point and define by a = A−c0||A−c0|| the according attack direction
vector. The i-th relative displacement, denoted by Di, is defined as
Di =
(ci − c0) · a
r
. W.l.o.g. we assume that c0 = 0.
(b) Attack strategies maximizing the displacement Di in each iteration i are referred to
as greedy optimal attack strategies.
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3. Attack Effectiveness for Infinite Horizon Centroid Learner
The effectiveness of a poisoning attack for an infinite horizon has been analyzed in Nelson
and Joseph (2006). We provide an alternative proof that follows the framework proposed
in the introduction.
Theorem 2 The i-th relative displacement Di of the online centroid learner with an infinite
horizon under the poisoning attack is bounded by
Di ≤ ln
(
1 +
i
n
)
, (3)
where i is the number of attack points and n the number of initial training points.
Proof We first determine an optimal attack strategy and then bound the attack progress.
(a) Let A be an attack point and denote by a the corresponding attack direction vector.
Let {ai|i ∈ N} be adversarial training points. The center of mass at the i-the iteration is
given in the following recursion:
ci+1 =
(
1− 1
n+ i
)
ci +
1
n+ i
ai+1, (4)
with initial value c0 = 0. By the construction of the poisoning attack, ||ai− ci|| ≤ r, which
is equivalent to ai = ci + bi with ||bi|| ≤ r. Eq. (4) can thus be transformed into
ci+1 = ci +
1
n+ i
bi.
Taking scalar product with a and using the definition of a relative displacement, we obtain:
Di+1 = Di +
1
n+ i
· bi · a
r
, (5)
with D0 = 0. The right-hand side of the Eq. (5) is clearly maximized under ||bi|| ≤ 1 by
setting bi = ra. Thus the optimal attack is defined by
ai = ci + ra. (6)
(b) Plugging the optimal strategy bi = ra into Eq (5), we have:
Di+1 = Di +
1
n+ i
.
This recursion can be explicitly solved, taking into account that d0 = 0, resulting in:
Di =
i∑
k=1
1
n+ k
=
n+i∑
k=1
1
k
−
n∑
k=1
1
k
.
Inserting the upper bound on the harmonic series,
∑m
k=1
1
k = ln(m) + m with m ≥ 0 into
the above formula, and noting that m is monotonically decreasing, we obtain
Di ≤ ln(n+ i)− ln(n) = ln
(
n+ i
n
)
= ln
(
1 +
i
n
)
,
9
which completes the proof.
Since the bound in Eq. (3) is monotonically increasing, we can invert it to obtain the
estimate of the effort needed by an attacker to achieve his goal:
i ≥ n · (exp (D∗)− 1) .
It can be seen that an effort need to poison a online centroid learner is exponential in terms
of the relative displacement of the center of mass.3 In other words, an attacker’s effort
grows prohibitively fast with respect to the separability of an attack from the innocuous
data. However, this is not surprising since due the infinitely growing training window the
contribution of new points to the computation of the center of mass is steadily decreasing.
4. Poisoning Attack against Finite Horizon Centroid Learner
As it was shown in Section 2.3, the poisoning attack is ineffective against online centroid
anomaly detection if all points are kept “in memory”. Unfortunately, memorizing the
points defeats the main purpose of online algorithms, i.e., their ability to adjust to non-
stationarity4. Hence it is important to understand how the removal of data points from a
working set affects the security of online anomaly detection. For that, the specific removal
strategies presented in Section 2.2 must be considered.
It will turn out that for the average- and random-out rules the analysis can be carried
out theoretically. For the nearest-out rule the analysis is more complicated but an optimal
attack can be stated as mathematical optimization problem, and the attack effectiveness
can be analyzed empirically.
4.1 Poisoning Attack for Average- and Random-out Rules
We begin our analysis with the average-out learner which follows exactly the same update
rule as the infinite-horizon online centroid learner with the exception that the window size
n remains fixed instead of growing indefinitely (cf. Section 2.2). Despite the similarity
to the infinite-horizon case, the result presented in the following theorem is surprisingly
pessimistic.
Theorem 3 The i-th relative displacement Di of the online centroid learner with the average-
out update rule under an worst-case optimal poisoning attack is
Di =
i
n
, (7)
where i is the number of attack points and n is the training window size.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. By explicitly writing out the
recurrence between subsequent displacements, we conclude that the optimal attack is also
3. Even constraining a maximum number of online update steps cannot remove the bound’s exponential
growth (Nelson and Joseph, 2006).
4. Once again we remark that the data need not be physically stored, hence the memory consumption is
not the main bottleneck in this case.
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attained by placing an attack point on the line connecting ci and a at the edge of the sphere
(cf. Eq. (6)):
ai = ci + ra.
It follows that the relative displacement under the optimal attack is
Di+1 = Di +
1
n
.
Since this recurrence is independent of the running index i, the displacement is simply ac-
cumulated over each iteration, which yields the bound of the theorem.
One can see, that unlike the logarithmic bound in Theorem 2, the average-out learner
is characterized by a linear bound on the displacement. As a result, an attacker only needs
a linear amount of injected points – instead of an exponential one – in order to subvert an
average-out learner. This cannot be considered secure.
We obtain a similar result for the random-out removal strategy.
Theorem 4 For the i-th relative displacement Di of the online centroid learner with the
random-out update rule under an worst-case optimal poisoning attack it holds
E(Di) =
i
n
, (8)
where i is the number of attack points, n is the training window size, and the expectation is
drawn over the choice of the removed data points.
Proof The proof is based on the observation that the random-out rule in expectation boils
down to average-out, and hence is reminiscent to the proof of Th. 3.
4.2 Poisoning Attack for Nearest-out Rule
Let us consider the alternative update strategies mentioned in Section 2.1. The update rule
c′ = c + 1n(x − x0) of the oldest-out strategy is essentially equivalent to the update rule
of the average-out except that the outgoing center c is replaced by the oldest point x0. In
both cases the point to be removed is fixed in advance regardless of an attacker’s moves,
hence the pessimistic result developed in Section 4.1 remains valid for this case. On average,
the random-out update strategy is – despite its nondeterministic nature – equivalent to the
average-out strategy. Hence, it also cannot be considered secure against a poisoning attack.
One might expect that the nearest-out strategy poses a stronger challenge to an attacker,
as it tries to keep as much of a working set diversity as possible by retaining the most similar
data to a new point. It turns out, however, that even this strategy can be broken with a
feasible amount of work if an attacker follows a greedy optimal strategy. The latter is a
subject of our investigation in this section.
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4.2.1 An optimal attack
Our investigation focuses on a greedy optimal attack, i.e., an attack that provides a maximal
gain for an attacker in a single iteration. For the infinite-horizon learner (and hence also for
the average-out learner, as it uses the same recurrence in a proof), it is possible to show that
the optimal attack yields the maximum gain for the entire sequence of attack iterations.
For the nearest-out learner, it is hard to analyze a full sequence of attack iterations, hence
we limit our analysis to a single-iteration gain. Empirically, even a greedy optimal attack
turns out to be effective.
To construct a greedy optimal attack, it suffices to determine for each point xi the
location of an optimal attack point x∗i to replace xi. This can be formulated as the following
optimization problem:
Optimization Problem 5 (greedy optimal attack)
{x∗i , fi} = maxx (x− xi) · a (9.a)
s.t. ‖x− xi‖ ≤ ‖x− xj‖, ∀j = 1, ..., n (9.b)
‖x− 1n
∑n
j=1 xj‖ ≤ r. (9.c)
The objective of the optimization problem 5 reflects an attacker’s goal of maximizing the
projection of x − xi onto the attack direction vector a. The constraint (9.b) specifies
the condition that the point xi is the nearest neighbor of x (i.e., x falls into a Voronoi cell
induced by xi). The constraint (9.c), when active, enforces that no solution lies outside of the
sphere. Hence the geometric intuition behind an optimal attack, illustrated in Figure 3, is to
replace some point with an attack point placed at the “corner” of the former’s Voronoi cell
(including possibly a round boundary of the centroid) that provides a highest displacement
of the center in the attack point’s direction.
The maximization of Eq. (9) over all points in a current working set yields the index of
the point to be replaced by an attacker:
α = argmax i∈1,...,n fi (10)
By plugging the definition of a Euclidean norm into the inner optimization problem
(9) and multiplying out the quadratic constraints, all but one norm constraints reduce to
simpler linear constraints:
{x∗i , fi} = maxx (x− xi) · a (11.a)
s.t. 2(xj − xi) · x ≤ xj · xj − xi · xi, ∀j = 1, ..., n (11.b)
x · x− 2n
∑n
j=1 x · xj ≤ r2 − 1n2
∑n
j,k=1 xj · xk. (11.c)
Due to the quadratic constraint (11.c), the inner optimization task is not as simple as a linear
or a quadratic program. However, several standard optimization packages, e.g., CPLEX
or MOSEK, can handle such so-called quadratically constrained linear programs (QCLP)
rather efficiently, especially when there is only one quadratic constraint. Alternatively, one
can use specialized algorithms for linear programming with a single quadratic constraint
(van de Panne, 1966; Martein and Schaible, 2005) or convert the quadratic constraint to a
second-order cone (SOC) constraint and use general-purpose conic optimization methods.
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Figure 3: The geometry of a poisoning attack for the nearest-out rule. An optimal attack
is achieved at the boundary of a Voronoi cell.
4.2.2 Implementation of a greedy optimal attack
Some additional work is needed for a practical implementation of a greedy optimal attack
against a nearest-out learner.
A point can become “immune” to a poisoning attack, if its Voronoi cell does not overlap
with the hypersphere of radius r centered at ck, at some iteration k. The quadratic con-
straint (9.c) is never satisfied in this case, and the inner optimization problem (9) becomes
infeasible. From then on, a point remains in the working set forever and slows down the
attack progress. To avoid this awkward situation, an attacker must keep track of all optimal
solutions x∗i of the inner optimization problems. If any x
∗
i slips out of the hypersphere after
replacing the point xα with x
∗
α, an attacker should ignore the outer loop decision (10) and
instead replace xi with x
∗
i .
A significant speedup can be attained by avoiding the solution of unnecessary QCLP
problems. Let S = {1, . . . , i − 1} and αS be the current best solution of the outer loop
problem (10) over the set S. Let fαS be the corresponding objective value of an inner
optimization problem (11). Consider the following auxiliary quadratic program (QP):
maxx ‖x− 1n
∑n
j=1 xj‖ (12.a)
s.t. 2(xj − xi) · x ≤ xj · xj − xi · xi, ∀j = 1, ..., n (12.b)
(x− xi) · a ≥ fαS . (12.c)
Its feasible set comprises the Voronoi cell of xi, defined by constraints (12.b), further reduced
by constraint (12.c) to the points that improve the current value fαS of the global objective
function. If the objective function value provided by the solution of the auxiliary QP (12)
exceeds r then the solution of the local QCLP (11) does not provide an improvement of the
global objective function fαS . Hence an expensive QCLP optimization can be skipped.
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4.2.3 Attack Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of a greedy optimal attack, we perform a simulation on an
artificial geometric data. The goal of this simulation is investigate the behavior of the
relative displacement Di during the progress of a greedy optimal attack.
An initial working set of size n = 100 is sampled from a d-dimensional Gaussian distri-
bution with unit covariance (experiments are repeated for various values of d ∈ {2, ..., 100}).
The radius r of the online centroid learner is chosen such that the expected false positive
rate is bounded by α = 0.001. An attack direction a, ‖a‖ = 1 is chosen randomly, and
500 attack iterations (5 ∗n) are generated using the procedure presented in Sections 4.2.1 –
4.2.2. The relative displacement of the center in the direction of attack is measured at each
iteration. For statistical significance, the results are averaged over 10 runs.
Figure 4(b) shows the observed progress of the greedy optimal attack against the nearest-
out learner and compares it to the behavior of the theoretical bounds for the infinite-horizon
learner (the bound of Nelson et al.) and the average-out learner. The attack effectiveness
is measured for all three cases by the relative displacement as a function of the number of
iterations. Plots for the nearest-out learner are presented for various dimensions d of the
artificial problems tested in simulations. The following two observations can be made from
the plots provided in Figure 4(a):
Firstly, the attack progress, i.e., the functional dependence of the relative displacement
of the greedy optimal attack against the nearest-out learner with respect to the number of
iterations, is linear. Hence, contrary to the initial intuition, the removal of nearest neighbors
to incoming points does not add security against a poisoning attack.
Secondly, the slope of the linear attack progress increases with the dimensionality of
the problem. For low dimensionality, the relative displacement of the nearest-out learner
is comparable, in absolute terms, with that of the infinite-horizon learner. For high di-
mensionality, the nearest-out learner becomes even less secure than the simple average-out
learner. By increasing the dimensionality beyond d > n the attack effectiveness cannot be
increased. Mathematical reasons for such behavior are investigated in Section B.1.
A further illustration of the behavior of the greedy optimal attack is given in Figure 4(b),
showing the dependence of the average attack slope on the dimensionality. One can see
that the attack slope increases logarithmically with the dimensionality and wanes out to
a constant factor after the dimensionality exceeds the number of training data points. A
theoretical explanation of the observed experimental results is given in the next section.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
To summarize our analysis for the case of attacker’s full control over the data, we conclude
that an optimal poisoning attack can successfully subvert a finite-horizon online centroid
learner for all outgoing point selection rules. This conclusion contrasts with the analysis
of the infinite-horizon learner carried out in Barreno et al. (2006) that yields a logarithmic
attack progress. As a compromise, one can in practice choose a large working set size n,
which reduces the slope of a linear attack progress.
Among the different outgoing point selection rules, the nearest-out rule presents some
challenges to the implementation of an optimal attack; however, some approximations can
make such an attack feasible while still maintaining a reasonable progress rate. The key
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of a poisoning attack for the nearest-out rule as a function of input
space dimensionality. The displacement of a centroid into a direction of an attack
grows linearly with the number of injected points. The slope of the linear growth
increases with the input space dimensionality. Upper bounds on the displacement
of the average-out rule rule are plotted for comparison.
factor for the success of a poisoning attack in the nearest-out case lies in the high dimen-
sionality of the feature space. The progress of an optimal poisoning attack depends on
the size of Voronoi cells induced by the training data points. The size of Voronoi cells is
related linearly to the volume of the sphere corresponding to attack’s feasible region. The
increasing dimensionality of a feature space blows up the volume of the sphere and hence
causes a higher attack progress rate.
In the following sections we analyze two additional factors that can affect the progress
of a poisoning attack. First, we consider the case of an attacker being able to control only
a fixed fraction ν of the training data. Subsequently we analyze a scenario in which an
attacker is not allowed to exceed a certain false positive rate α, e.g., by stopping online
learning when a high false positive rate is observed. In will be shown that both of these
possible constraints significantly reduce the effectiveness of a poisoning attack.
5. Poisoning Attack with Limited Bandwidth Constraint
We now proceed with investigation of a poisoning attack under a limited bandwidth con-
straint imposed on an attacker. We assume that an attacker can only inject up to a fraction
of ν of the training data. In security applications, such an assumption is natural, as it may
be difficult for an attacker to surpass a certain amount of innocuous traffic. For simplicity,
we restrict ourselves to the average-out learner, as we have seen that it only differs by a
constant from a nearest-out one and in expectation equals a random-out one.
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5.1 Learning and Attack model
The initial online centroid learner is centered at the position X0 and has the radius r
(w.l.o.g. assume X0 = 0 and r = 1). At each iteration a new training point arrives which is
either inserted by an adversary or is drawn independently from the distribution of innocuous
points, and a new center of mass Xi is calculated
5. The mixing of innocuous and attack
points is modeled by a Bernoulli random variable with the parameter ν. Adversarial points
Ai are chosen according to an attack function f depending on the actual state of the learner
Xi. The innocuous pool is modeled by a probability distribution, from which the innocuous
points i are independently drawn. We assume that the expectation of innocuous points
i coincides with the initial center of mass: E(i) = X0. Furthermore, we assume that all
innocuous points are accepted by the initial learner, i.e., ‖i −X0‖ ≤ r.
Moreover, for didactical reasons, we make a rather artificial assumption, which we will
drop in the next chapter: all innocuous points are accepted by the learner, at any time of
the attack, independent of their actual distance to the center of mass. In the next section we
drop this assumption, such that the learner only accept points which fall within the actual
radius.
The described probabilistic model is formalized by the following axiom.
Axiom 6 {Bi|i ∈ N} are independent Bernoulli random variables with parameter ν > 0.
i are i.i.d. random variables in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space H, drawn from a fixed
but unknown distribution P, satisfying E(i) = 0 and ‖i‖ ≤ r = 1 for each i. Bi and
j are mutually independent for each i, j. f : H → H is an attack strategy satisfying
‖f(x)− x‖ ≤ r. {Xi|i ∈ N} is a collection of random vectors such that X0 = 0 and
Xi+1 = Xi +
1
n
(Bif(Xi) + (1−Bi)i −Xi) . (13)
For simplicity of notation, we in this section refer to a collection of random vectors
{Xi|i ∈ N} satisfying Axiom 6 as online centroid learner denoted by C. Furthermore we
denote  :=  · a. Any function f satisfying Ax. 6 is called attack strategy.
According to the above axiom an adversary’s attack strategy is formalized by an arbi-
trary function f . This raises the question which attack strategies are optimal in the sense
that an attacker reaches his goal of concealing a predefined attack direction vector in a
minimal number of iterations. An attack’s progress is measured by projecting the current
center of mass onto the attack direction vector:
Definition 7
(a) Let a be an attack direction vector (w.l.o.g. ||a|| = 1), and let C = {Xi|i ∈ N} be a
online centroid learner. The i-th displacement of C, denoted by Di, is defined by
Di =
Xi · a
R
.
(b) Attack strategies maximizing the displacement Di in each iteration i are referred to
as optimal attack strategies.
5. To emphasize the probabilistic model used in this section, we denote the location of a center and the
relative displacement by capital letters.
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5.2 An Optimal Attack
The following result characterizes an optimal attack strategy for the model specified in
Axiom 6.
Proposition 8 Let a be an attack direction vector and let C be a centroid learner. Then
the optimal attack strategy f is given by
f(Xi) := Xi + a . (14)
Proof Since by Axiom 6 we have ‖f(x)− x‖ ≤ r, any valid attack strategy can be written
as f(x) = x+ g(x), such that ‖g‖ ≤ r = 1. It follows that
Di+1 ≤ Xi+1 · a
=
(
Xi +
1
n
(Bif(Xi) + (1−Bi)i −Xi)
)
· a
= Di +
1
n
(BiDi +Big(Xi)·a + (1−Bi)i −Di) .
Since Bi ≥ 0, the optimal attack strategy should maximize g(Xi) ·a subject to ||g(Xi)|| ≤ 1.
The maximum is clearly attained by setting g(Xi) = a.
5.3 Attack Effectiveness
The estimate of an optimal attack’s effectiveness in the limited control case is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 9 Let C be a centroid learner under an optimal poisoning attack. Then, for the
displacement Di of C, it holds:
(a) E(Di) = (1− ci) ν
1− ν
(b) Var(Di) ≤ γi
(
ν
1− ν
)2
+ δn
where γi = ci − di, ci :=
(
1− 1−νn
)i
, di =
(
1− 1−νn
(
2− 1n
))i
and δn :=
ν2+(1−di)
(2n−1)(1−ν)2 .
Proof (a) Inserting the optimal attack strategy of Eq. (14) into Eq. (13) of Ax. 6, we have:
Xi+1 = Xi +
1
n
(Bi (Xi + a) + (1−Bi)i −Xi) ,
which can be rewritten as:
Xi+1 =
(
1− 1−Bi
n
)
Xi +
Bi
n
a +
(1−Bi)
n
i . (15)
17
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
i/n
D
i
 
 
average−out (finite horizon)
average−out (infinite horizon)
ν=5%
ν=100%
ν=50%
ν=20%
Figure 5: Theoretical behavior of the displacement of a centroid under a poisoning attack
for a bounded fraction of traffic under attacker’s control. The infinite horizon
bound of Nelson et al. is shown for comparison (solid line).
Taking the expectation on the latter equation, and noting that by Axiom 6 E() = 0 and
E(Bi) = ν holds, we have
E (Xi+1) =
(
1− 1− ν
n
)
E(Xi) +
ν
n
a ,
which by Def. 7 translates to
E(Di+1) =
(
1− 1− ν
n
)
E(Di) +
ν
n
.
The statement (a) follows from the latter recursive eequation by Prop. 17 (formula of the
geometric series). For the more demanding proof of (b), see Appendix B.2.
The following corollary shows the asymptotic behavior of the above theorem.
Corollary 10 Let C be a centroid learner satisfying under an optimal poisoning attack.
Then. for the displacement Di of C, it holds:
(a) E(Di) ≤ ν
1− ν for all i
(b) Var(Di) → 0 for i, n→∞.
Proof The corollary follows by γi, δn → 0 for i, n→∞.
The growth of the above bounds as a function of an number of attack iterations is
illustrated in Fig. 5.3. One can see that the attack’s success strongly depends on the
fraction of the training data controlled by an attacker. For small ν, the attack progress
is bounded by a constant, which implies that an attack fails even with an infinite effort.
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by vertical bars.
This result provides a much stronger security guarantee than the exponential bound for the
infinite horizon case.
To empirically investigate the tightness of the derived bound we compute a Monte Carlo
simulation of Axiom 6 with the parameters ν = 0.05, n = 100000, H = R2, and  being
a uniform distribution over the unit circle. Fig. 5.3 shows a typical displacement curve
over the first 500, 000 attack iterations. Errorbars are computed over 10 repetitions of the
simulation.
6. Poisoning Attack under False Positive Constraints
In the last section we have assumed, that innocuous training points i are always accepted
by the online centroid learner. But while an attacker displaces the hypersphere, it may
happen that some innocuous points drop out of the hypersphere’s boundary. We have seen
that an attacker’s impact highly depends on the fraction of points he places. If an attacker
succeeds in pushing the hypersphere far enough such that sufficiently many innocuous points
drop out, he can quickly displace the hypersphere.
6.1 Learning and Attack Model
Motivated by the above considerations we modify the probabilistic model of the last section
as follows. Again we consider a online centroid learner initially anchored at a position X0
having a radius r, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality X0 = 0 and
r = 1. Then innocuous and adversarial points are mixed into the training data according
to a fixed fraction, controlled by a binary valued random variable Bi. But now, in contrast
to the last section, innocuous points i are only accepted if and only if they fall within a
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radius of r of the hypersphere’s center Xi. In addition, to avoid the learner being quickly
displaced, we require that the false alarm rate is bounded by α. If the latter is exceeded,
we assume the adversary’s attack to have failed, i.e., a safe state of the learner is loaded
and the online update mechanism is temporarily switched off.
We formalize the probabilistic model as follows:
Axiom 11 {Bi|i ∈ N} are independent Bernoulli random variables with parameter ν > 0.
i are i.i.d. random variables in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space H, drawn from a fixed
but unknown distribution P = P−, satisfying E(i) = 0, and ‖i‖ ≤ r = 1 for each i. Bi
and j are mutually independent for each i, j. f : H → H is an attack strategy satisfying
‖f(x)− x‖ ≤ r. {Xi|i ∈ N} is a collection of random vectors such that X0 = 0 and
Xi+1 = Xi +
1
n
(
Bi (f(Xi)−Xi) + (1−Bi)I{‖i−Xi‖≤r} (i −Xi)
)
, (16)
if Ei
(
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}
) ≤ 1− α and by Xi+1 = 0 elsewise.
For simplicity of notation, we in this section refer to a collection of random vectors
{Xi|i ∈ N} satisfying Ax. 11 as online centroid learner with maximal false positive rate α
denoted by C. Any function f satisfying Ax. 11 is called attack strategy. Optimal attack
strategies are characterized in term of the displacement as in the previous section (see
Def. 7).
6.2 Optimal Attack and Attack Effectiveness
The following result characterizes an optimal attack strategy for the model specified in
Axiom 11.
Proposition 12 Let a be an attack direction vector and let C be a centroid learner with
maximal false positive rate α. Then an optimal attack strategy f is given by
f(Xi) := Xi + a .
Proof Since by Axiom 11 we have ‖f(x)−x‖ ≤ r, any valid attack strategy can be written
as f(x) = x+ g(x), such that ‖g‖ ≤ r = 1. It follows that either Di = 0, in which case the
optimal f is arbitrary, or we have
Di+1 = Xi+1 · a
=
(
Xi +
1
n
(Bif(Xi) + (1−Bi)i −Xi)
)
· a
= Di +
1
n
(Bi (Di + g(Xi)) + (1−Bi)i −Di)
Since Bi ≥ 0, the optimal attack strategy should maximize g(Xi) ·a subject to ||g(Xi)|| ≤ 1.
The maximum is clearly attained by setting g(Xi) = a.
The estimate of an optimal attack’s effectiveness in the limited control case is given in
the following main theorem of this paper.
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Theorem 13 Let C be a centroid learner with maximal false positive rate α under a poi-
soning attack. Then, for the displacement Di of C, it holds:
(a) E(Di) ≤ (1− ci) ν + α(1− ν)
(1− ν)(1− α)
(b) Var(Di) ≤ γi ν
2
(1− α)2(1− ν)2 + ρ(α) + δn
where ci :=
(
1− (1−ν)(1−α)n
)i
, di =
(
1− 1−νn (2− 1n)(1− α)
)i
, γi = (ci − di), ρ(α) =
α (1−ci)(1−di)(2ν(1−α)+α)
(1− 1
2n
)(1−ν)2(1−α)2 , and δn =
(1−di)(ν+(1−ν)E(2i ))
(2n−1)(1−ν)(1−α) .
The proof is technically demanding and is given in App. B.3. Despite the more general
proof reasoning, we recover the tightness of the bounds of the previous section for the special
case of α = 0, as shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 14 Suppose a maximal false positive rate of α = 0. Then, the bounds on the
expected displacement Di, as given by Th. 9 and Th. 13, coincident. Furthermore, the
variance bound of Th. 13 upper bounds the one of Th. 9.
Proof We start by setting α = 0 in Th. 13(a). Then, clearly the latter bound coincidents
with its counterpart in Th. 9. For the proof of the second part of the corollary, we observe
that ρ(α) = 0 and that the quantities ci, di, and γi coincident with its counterparts in Th. 9.
Moreover, removing the distribution dependence by upper bounding E(i) ≤ 1 reveals that
δi is upper bounded by its counter part of Th. 9. Hence, the whole expression on the right
hand side of Th. 13(b) is upper bounded by its counterpart in Th. 9(b).
The following corollary shows the asymptotic behavior of the above theorem. It follows
from γi, δn, ρ(α)→ 0 for i, n→∞, and α→ 0, respectively.
Corollary 15 Let C be a centroid learner with maximal false positive rate α satisfying the
optimal attack strategy. Then for the displacement of C, denoted by Di, we have:
(a) E(Di) ≤ ν + α(1− ν)
(1− ν)(1− α) for all i
(b) Var(Di) → 0 for i, n→∞, α→ 0 .
From the previous theorem, we can see that for small false positive rates α ≈ 0, which
are common in many applications, e.g., Intrusion Detection (see Sect. 7 for an extensive
analysis), the bound approximately equals the one of the previous section, i.e., we have
E(Di) ≤ ν1−ν + δ where δ > 0 is a small constant with δ → 0. Inverting the bound we
obtain the useful formula
ν ≥ E(Di)
1 + E(Di)
(17)
which gives a lower bound on the minimal ν an adversary has to employ for an attack to
succeed.
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Figure 7: Theoretical behavior of the displacement of a centroid under a poisoning attack
for different levels of false positive protection α. The predicted displacement
curve for α = 0 coincides with the one shown in Fig. 5.3.
The bound of Th. 13 is shown in Fig. 5.3 for different levels of false positive protection
α ∈ [0, 0.025]. We are especially interested in low positive rates which are common in
anomaly detection applications. One can see that much of the tightness of the bounds of
the previous section is preserved. In the extreme case α = 0 the bounds coincident, as been
shown in Cor. 14.
7. Case Study: Application to Intrusion Detection
In this section we present the experimental evaluation of the developed analytical instru-
ments in the context of a particular computer security application: intrusion detection.
Centroid anomaly detection has been previously used in several intrusion detection systems
(e.g., Hofmeyr et al., 1998; Lazarevic et al., 2003; Wang and Stolfo, 2004; Laskov et al.,
2004b; Wang et al., 2005; Rieck and Laskov, 2006; Wang et al., 2006; Rieck and Laskov,
2007). After a short presentation of data collection, preprocessing and model selection,
our experiments aim at verification of the theoretically obtained growth rates for attack
progress as well as computation of constant factors for specific exploits.
7.1 Data Corpus and Preprocessing
The data to be used in our case study represents real HTTP traffic recorded at Fraun-
hofer FIRST. We consider the intermediate granularity level of requests which are the
basic application-layer syntactic elements of the HTTP protocol. Packet headers have been
stripped, and requests spread across multiple packets have been merged together. The re-
sulting benign dataset consists of 2950 byte strings containing payloads of inbound HTTP
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requests. The malicious dataset consists of 69 attack instances from 20 classes generated
using the Metasploit penetration testing framework6. All exploits were normalized to match
the frequent attributes of innocuous HTTP requests such that the malicious payload pro-
vides the only indicator for identifying the attacks.
As byte sequences are not directly suitable for application of machine learning algo-
rithms, we deploy a k-gram spectrum kernel (Leslie et al., 2002; Shawe-Taylor and Cris-
tianini, 2004) for the computation of the inner products. To enable fast comparison of large
byte sequences (a typical sequence length 500-1000 bytes), efficient algorithms using sorted
arrays (Rieck and Laskov, 2008) have been implemented. Furthermore, kernel values are
normalized according to
k(x, x¯) 7−→ k(x, x¯)√
k(x,x)k(x¯, x¯)
, (18)
to avoid a dependence on the length of a request payload. The resulting inner products
subsequently have been processed by an RBF kernel.
7.2 Learning Model
The feature space selected for our experiments depends on two parameters: the k-gram
length and the RBF kernel width σ. Prior to the main experiments aimed at the validation
of proposed security analysis techniques, we investigate optimal model parameters in our
feature space. The parameter range considered is k = 1, 2, 3 and σ = 2−5, 2−4, ..., 25.
To carry out model selection, we randomly partitioned the innocuous corpus into disjoint
training, validation and test sets (of sizes 1000, 500 and 500). The training partition is
comprised of the innocuous data only, as the online centroid learner assumes clean training
data. The validation and test partitions are mixed with 10 attack instances randomly
chosen from different attack classes.7 For each partition, different online centroid learner
models are trained on a training set and evaluated on a validation and a test sets using
the normalized8 AUC[0,0.01] as a performance measure. For statistical significance, model
selection is repeated 1000 times with different randomly drawn partitions. The average
values of the normalized AUC[0,0.01] for the different k values on test partitions are given in
Table 1.
It can be seen that the 3-gram model consistently shows better AUC values for both
the linear and the best RBF kernels. We have chosen the linear kernel for the remaining
experiments, since it allows to carry out computations directly in input space with only a
marginal penalty in detection accuracy.
7.3 Intrinsic HTTP Data Dimensionality
Dimensionality of training data makes an important contribution to the (in)security of the
online centroid learner when using the nearest-out update rule. Simulations on artificial data
(cf. Section 4.2.3) show that the slope of a linear progress rate of a poisoning attack increases
for larger dimensionalities d. This can be also explained theoretically (cf. Section B.1) by
6. http://www.metasploit.com/
7. The latter requirement reflects the goal of anomaly detection to recognize previously unknown attacks.
8. such that an AUC of 1 is the highest achievable value
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linear best RBF kernel optimal σ
1-grams 0.913± 0.051 0.985± 0.021 2−2.5
2-grams 0.979± 0.026 0.985± 0.025 2−1.5
3-grams 0.987± 0.018 0.989± 0.017 2−0.5
Table 1: Accuracy of the linear kernel and the best RBF kernel as well as the optimal
bandwidth σ.
the fact that radius of Voronoi cells induced by training data is proportional to d
√
1/n,
which increases with growing d.
For the intrusion detection application at hand, the dimensionality of the chosen feature
space (k-grams with k = 3) is 2563. In view of Th. 16, the dimensionality of the relevant
subspace in which attack takes place is bounded by the size of the training data n, which
is much smaller, in the range of 100 – 1000 for realistic applications. Yet the real progress
rate depends on the intrinsic dimensionality of the data. When the latter is smaller than
the size of the training data, an attacker can compute a PCA of the data matrix (Scho¨lkopf
et al., 1998) and project the original data into a subspace spanned by a smaller number of
informative components.
To determine the intrinsic dimensionality of possible training sets drawn from HTTP
traffic, we randomly drew 1000 elements from the training set, calculate a linear kernel
matrix in the space of 3-grams and compute its eigenvalue decomposition. We then deter-
mine the number of leading eigen-components preserving as a function of the percentage of
variance preserved. The results averaged over 100 repetitions are shown in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8: Intrinsic dimensionality of the embedded HTTP data. The preserved variance is
plotted as a function of the number of eigencomponents, k, employed for calcu-
lation of variance (solid blue line). The tube indicates standard deviations.
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It can be seen that 250 kernel PCA components are needed to preserve 99% of the
variance. This implies that, although effective dimensionality of HTTP traffic is significantly
smaller that the number of training data points, it still remains sufficiently high so that the
rate of attack progress approaches 1, which is similar to the simple average-out learner.
7.4 Geometrical Constraints of HTTP Data
Several technical difficulties arising from data geometry have to be overcome in launching
a poisoning attack in practice. It turns out, however, that the consideration of the training
data geometry provides an attacker with efficient tools for finding reasonable approximations
for the above mentioned tasks.
(1) First, we cannot directly simulate a poisoning attack in the 3-gram input space
due to its high dimensionality. An approximately equivalent explicit feature space can be
constructed by applying kernel PCA to the kernel matrix K. By pruning the eigenvalues
“responsible” for dimensions with low variance one can reduce the size of the feature space
to the implicit dimensionality of a problem if the kernel matches the data (Braun et al.,
2008). In all subsequent experiments we used d = 256 as suggested by the experiments in
Section 7.3.
(2) Second the crucial normalization condition (18) requires that a solution lies on a
unit sphere.9 Unfortunately, this renders the calculation of an optimal attack point non-
convex. Therefore we pursue the following heuristic procedure to enforce normalization:
we explicitly project local solutions (for each Voronoi cell) to a unit sphere, verify their
feasibility (the radius and the cell constraints), and remove infeasible points from the outer
loop (10).
(3) In general one cannot expect each feature space vector to correspond to a valid byte
sequence since not all combinations of k-grams can be “glued” to a valid byte sequence.
In fact, finding a sequence with the best approximation to a given k-gram feature vector
has been shown to be NP-hard (Fogla and Lee, 2006). Fortunately by the fact that an
optimal attack lies in the span of training data, i.e. Th. 16, we construct an attack’s byte
sequence by concatenating original sequences of basis points with rational coefficients that
approximately match the coefficients of the linear combination. A potential disadvantage
of this method is the large increase in the sequence lengths. Large requests are conspicuous
and may consume significant resources on the attacker’s part.
(4) An attack byte sequence must be embedded in a valid HTML protocol frame. Build-
ing a valid HTTP request with arbitrary content is, in general, a non-trivial task, especially
if it is required that a request does not cause an error on a server. An HTTP request
consists of fixed format headers and a variable format body. A most straightforward way to
stealthily introduce arbitrary content is to provide a body in a request whose method (e.g.,
GET) does not require one. According to an RFC specification of the HTTP protocol, a
request body should be ignored by a server in this case.
9. In the absence of normalization, the high variability of the byte sequence lengths leads to poor accuracy
of the centroid anomaly detection.
25
7.5 Poisoning Attack for Finite Horizon Centroid Learner
The analysis carried out in Section 4 shows that an online centroid learner, in general, does
not provide sufficient security if an attacker fully controls the data. Practical efficiency of
a poisoning attack, however, depends on the dimensionality and geometry of training data
analyzed in the previous section. Theoretical results have been illustrated in simulations on
artificial data presented in Section 4.2.3. Experiments in this section are intended to verify
whether these findings hold for real attacks against HTTP applications. Our experiments
focus on the nearest-out learner, as other update rules can be easily attacked with trivial
methods.
We are now in the position to evaluate the progress rate of a poisoning attack on real
network traffic and exploits. The goal of these experiments is to verify simulations carried
out in Section 4.2.2 on real data.
Our experimental protocol is as follows. We randomly draw n = 250 training points
from the innocuous corpus, calculate the center of mass and fix the radius such that the
false positive rate on the training data is α = 0.001. Then we draw a random instance from
each of the 20 attack classes, and for each of these 20 attack instances generate a poisoning
attack as described in Section 7.4. An attack succeeds when the attack point is accepted
as innocuous by a learning algorithm.
For each attack instance, the number of iterations needed for an attack to succeed and
the respective displacement of the center of mass is recorded. Figure 9 shows, for each attack
instance, the behavior of the relative displacement at the point of success as a function of
a number of iterations. We interpolate a “displacement curve” from these pointwise values
by a linear least-squares regression. For comparison, the theoretical upper bounds for the
average-out and all-in cases are shown. Notice that the bound for the all-in strategy is also
almost linear for the small i/n ratios observed in this experiment.
The observed results confirm that the linear progress rate in the full control scenario
can be attained in practice for real data. Compared to the simulations of Section 7.4, the
progress rate of an attack is approximately half the one for the average-out case. Although
this somewhat contradicts our expectation that for a high-dimensional space (of the effective
dimensionality d ∼ 256 as it was found in Section 7.3) the progress rate to the average-out
case should be observed, this can be attributed to multiple approximations performed in
the generation of an attack for real byte sequences. The practicality of a poisoning attack is
further emphasized by a small number of iterations needed for an attack to succeed: from 0
to only 35 percent of the initial number of points in the training data have to be overwritten
by an attacker.
7.6 Critical Traffic Ratios of HTTP Attacks
For the case of attacker’s limited control, the success of the poisoning attack largely depends
on attacker’s constraints, as shown in the analysis in Sections 5 and 6. The main goal of the
experiments in this section is therefore to investigate the impact of potential constraints in
practice. In particular, we are interested in the impact of the traffic ratio ν and the false
positive rate α.
The analysis in Section 5 (cf. Theorem 9 and Figure 5.3) shows that the displacement
of a poisoning attack is bounded from above by a constant, depending on the traffic ratio
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Figure 9: Empirical displacement of the nearest-out centroid for 20 different exploits
(crosses, linear fit shown by a red dotted line). Displacement values are shown at
the point of success for each attack. Theoretical bounds are shown for comparison
(blue and black lines).
ν controlled by an attacker. Hence the susceptibility of a learner to a particular attack
depends on the value of this constant. If an attacker does not control a sufficiently large
traffic portion and the potential displacement is bounded by a constant smaller than the
distance from the initial center of mass to the attack point, then an attack is bound to
fail. To illustrate this observation, we compute critical traffic rates needed for the success
of each of the 20 attack classes in our malicious pool.
We randomly draw a 1000-elemental training set from the innocuous pool and calculate
its center of mass (in the space of 3-grams). The radius is fixed such the false positive rate
α = 0.001 on innocuous data is attained. For each of the 20 attack classes we compute
the class-wise median distance to the centroid’s boundary. Using these distance values we
calculate the “critical value” νcrit by solving Th. 9(c) for ν (cf. Eq. (17)). The experiments
have been repeated 10 times results are shown in Table 2.
The results indicate that in order to subvert a online centroid learner an attacker needs
to control from 5 to 20 percent of traffic. This could be a significant limitation on highly
visible sites. Note that an attacker usually aims at earning money by hacking computer
systems. However generating competitive bandwidths at highly visible site is likely to drive
the attacker’s cost to exorbitant numbers.
On the other hand, one can see that the traffic rate limiting alone cannot be seen
as sufficient protection instrument due to its passive nature. In the following section we
investigate a different protection scheme using both traffic ratio and the false positive rate
control.
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Attacks Rel. dist. νcrit
ALT-N WebAdmin Overflow 0.058± 0.002 0.055± 0.002
ApacheChunkedEncoding 0.176± 0.002 0.150± 0.001
AWStats ConfigDir Execution 0.067± 0.002 0.063± 0.002
Badblue Ext Overflow 0.168± 0.002 0.144± 0.001
Barracuda Image Execution 0.073± 0.002 0.068± 0.002
Edirectory Host 0.153± 0.002 0.132± 0.001
IAWebmail 0.178± 0.002 0.151± 0.001
IIS 5.0 IDQ exploit 0.162± 0.002 0.140± 0.001
Pajax Execute 0.107± 0.002 0.097± 0.002
PEERCAST URL 0.163± 0.002 0.140± 0.001
PHP Include 0.097± 0.002 0.088± 0.002
PHP vBulletin 0.176± 0.002 0.150± 0.001
PHP XML RPC 0.172± 0.002 0.147± 0.001
HTTP tunnel 0.160± 0.002 0.138± 0.001
IIS 4.0 HTR exploit 0.176± 0.002 0.149± 0.002
IIS 5.0 printer exploit 0.161± 0.002 0.138± 0.001
IIS unicode attack 0.153± 0.002 0.133± 0.001
IIS w3who exploit 0.168± 0.002 0.144± 0.001
IIS 5.0 WebDAV exploit 0.179± 0.002 0.152± 0.001
rproxy exploit 0.155± 0.002 0.134± 0.001
Table 2: Relative distances (in radii) of exploits to the boundary of a centroid enclosing all
training points and critical values of parameter ν.
7.7 Poisoning Attack against Learner with False Positive Protection
The analysis in Section 5 (cf. Theorem 9 and Figure 5.3) shows that the displacement of a
poisoning attack is bounded from above by a constant, depending on a traffic ratio ν and
a maximal false positive rate α. Hence a detection system can be protected by observing
the system’s false positive rate and switching off the online updates if a defined threshold
is exceeded.
7.7.1 Experiment 1: Practicability of False Positive Protection
However in practice the system should be as silent as possible, i.e., an administrator should
be only alarmed if a fatal danger to the system is given. We hence in this section investigate
how sensible the false positive rate is to small adversarial perturbations of the learner, caused
by poisoning attack with small ν.
Therefore the following experiment investigates the rise in the false positive rate α as a
function of ν. From the innocuous pool we randomly drew a 1000-elemental training set on
base of which a centroid is calculated. Thereby the radius is fixed to the empirical estimate of
the 0.001-quantile of the innocuous pool based on 100 randomly drawn subsamples, i.e., we
expect the centroid having a false positive rate of α = 0.001 on the innocuous pool. Moreover
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Figure 10: Maximal false positive rate within 10000 attack iterations as a function of ν
(maximum taken over 10 runs).
we randomly drew a second 500-elemental training set from the innocuous pool which is
reserved for online training and and a 500-elemental hold out set on base of which a false
positive rate can be estimated for a given centroid. Then we iteratively calculated poisoning
attacks with fixed IIS 5.0 WebDAV exploit as attack point by subsequently presenting online
training points to the centroid learner which are rejected or accepted based on whether they
fall within the learner’s radius. For each run of a poisoning attack the false positiv rate is
observed on base of the hold out set.
In Fig. 10 we plot for various values of ν the maximal observed false positive rate as
a function of ν, where the maximum is taken over all attack iterations and 10 runs. One
can see from the plot that α = 0.005 is a reasonable threshold in our setting to ensure the
systems’s silentness.
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Figure 11: A simulation of a poisoning attack under limited control.
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7.7.2 Experiment 2: Attack Simulation for False Positive Protection
In the previous experiment we have seen that α = 0.005 is a reasonable threshold for a
false positive protection to ensure a systems silentness. We in this section illustrate that
the critical values from Section 7.6 computed on base of Th. 9 for maximal false positive
rate of α = 0.005 still give a good approximation of the true impact of a poisoning attack.
We fix a particular exploit in our malicious corpus (IIS WebDAV 5.0 exploit) and run a
poisoning attack against the average-out centroid for various values of ν ∈ [0.05, 0.10, 0.14, 0.16],
recording the actual displacement curves. One can see from Fig. 11 that the attack suc-
ceeds for ν = 0.16 but fails to reach the required relative displacement of Dcrit = 0.18
for ν = 0.14. The theoretically computed critical traffic ratio for this attack according to
Table 2 is νcrit = 0.152. The experiment shows that the derived bounds are surprisingly
tight in practice.
7.7.3 Implementation of Poisoning Protection
In Section 5 we have seen, that an attacker’s impact on corrupting the training data highly
depends on the fraction of adversarial points in the training data stream. This implies that
a high amount of innocuous training points constantly has to come in. In Section 6 we
have seen, that we can secure the learner by setting a threshold on the false positive rate
α. Exceeding the latter enforces further defense processes such as switching off the online
training process. Hence an confident estimation of α has to be at hand. How can we achieve
the latter?
In practice, this can e.g. be done by caching the training data. When the cache exceeds
a certain value at which we have a confident estimation of α (e.g., after 24 hours), the
cached training data can be applied to the learner. Since in applications including intrusion
detection, we usually deal with a very high amount of training data, a confident estimation
is already possible after short time period.
8. Discussion and Conclusions
Understanding of security properties of learning algorithms is essential for their protection
against abuse. The latter can take place when learning is used in applications with com-
petitive interests at stake, e.g., security monitoring, games, spam protection, reputation
systems, etc. Certain security properties of a learning algorithm must be proved in order
to claim its immunity to abuse. To this end, we have developed a methodology for security
analysis and applied it for a specific scenario of online centroid anomaly detection. The
results of our analysis highlight conditions under which an attacker’s effort to subvert this
algorithm is prohibitively high.
Several issues discussed in this contribution have appeared in related work albeit not
in the area of anomaly detection. Perhaps the most consummate treatment of learning
under an adversarial impact has been carried out by Dalvi et al. (2004). In this work,
Bayesian classification is analyzed for robustness against adversarial impact. The choice of
their classifier is motivated by widespread application of the naive Bayes classification in the
domain of spam detection where real examples of adversarial impact have been observed for
a long time. The adversarial classification is considered as a game between an attacker and
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a learner. Due to the complexity of analysis, only one move by each party can be analyzed.
Similar to our approach, Dalvi et al. (2004) formalize the problem by defining cost functions
of an attacker and a learner (Step 1) and determine an optimal adversarial strategy (Step 3).
Although the attacker’s constraints are not explicitly treated theoretically, several scenarios
using specific constraints have been tested experimentally. No analysis of the attacker’s gain
is carried out; instead, the learner’s direct response to adversarial impact is considered.
A somewhat related approach has been developed for handling worst-case random noise,
e.g., random feature deletion (Globerson and Roweis, 2006; Dekel and Shamir, 2008). Sim-
ilar to Dalvi et al. (2004), both of these methods construct a classifier that automatically
reacts to the worst-case noise or, equivalently, the optimal adversarial strategy. In both
methods, the learning problem is formulated as a large-margin classification using a spe-
cially constructed risk function. An important role in this approach is played by the con-
sideration of constraints (Step 2), e.g., in the form of the maximal number of corruptible
features. Although these approaches do not quantitatively analyze attacker’s gain, (Dekel
and Shamir, 2008) contains an interesting learning-theoretic argument that relates classifi-
cation accuracy, sparseness, and robustness against adversarial noise.
To summarize, we believe that despite recent evidence of possible attacks against ma-
chine learning and the currently lacking theoretical foundations for learning under adver-
sarial impact, machine learning algorithms can be protected against such impact. The key
to such protection lies in quantitative analysis of security of machine learning. We have
shown that such analysis can be rigorously carried out for specific algorithms and attacks.
Further work should extend such analysis to more complex learning algorithms and a wider
attack spectrum.
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Appendix A. Notation Summary
In this paper we use the following notational conventions.
C, r, c centroid C with radius r and center c
i i-th attack iteration, i ∈ N0
xi,Xi center of centroid in i-th attack iteration
A attack point
a attack direction vector
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Di i-th relative displacement of a centroid in
radii into direction of a
n number of training patterns of centroid
f function of H → H giving an attack strat-
egy
ν fraction of adversarial training points
Bi Bernoulli variable
i, i i.i.d. noise
α false alarm rate
IS indicator function of a set S
Appendix B. Auxiliary Material and Proofs
B.1 Auxiliary Material for Section 4
B.1.1 Representer Theorem for Optimal Greedy Attack
First, we show why the attack efficiency cannot be increased beyond dimensions with d ≥
n+ 1. This follows from the fact that the optimal attack lies in the span of the working set
points and the attack vector. The following representer theorem allows for “kernelization”
of the optimal greedy attack.
Theorem 16 There exists an optimal solution of problem (11) satisfying
x∗i ∈ span(a,x1, ...,xn). (19)
Proof The Lagrangian of optimization problem (11) is given by:
L(x,α, β) = −(x− xi) · a +
n∑
j=1
αj (2(xj − xi) · x− xj · xj + xi · xi)
+β
x · x− 2
n
n∑
j=1
x · xj + 1
n2
n∑
j,k=1
xj · xk − r2

Since the feasible set of problem (11) is bounded by the spherical constraint and is not empty
(xi trivially is contained in the feasible set), there exists at least one optimal solution x
∗
i
to the primal. For optimal x∗i , α
∗ and β∗, we have the following first order optimality
conditions
δL
δx
= 0 : − a− 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj + 2
n∑
j=1
α∗j (xj − xi) + β∗
2x∗i − 2n
n∑
j=1
xj
 = 0 . (20)
If β∗ 6= 0 the latter equation can be resolved for x∗i leading to:
x∗i =
1
2β∗
a +
n∑
j=1
(
1
2β∗n
− α
∗
j
β∗
+
1
n
)
xj +
1
β∗
n∑
j=1
α∗jxi .
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From the latter equation we see that x is contained in S := span(x1, ...,xn and a).
Now assume β∗ = 0 and x∗i /∈ S. Basically the idea of the following reasoning is to use
x∗i to construct an optimal point which is contained in S. At first, since β
∗ = 0, we see from
Eq. (20) that a is contained in the subspace S := span(x1, ...,xn). Hence the objective,
(x− xi) · a, only depends on the optimal x via inner products with the data xi. The same
naturally holds for the constraints. Hence both, the objective value and the constraints, are
invariant under the projection of x∗i onto S, denoted by P . Hence P (x
∗
i ) also is an optimal
point. Moreover by construction P (x∗i ) ∈ S = span(x∗1, ...,x∗n).
B.1.2 Theoretical Analysis for the Optimal Greedy Attack
The dependence of an attack’s effectiveness on the data dimensionality results from the
geometry of Voronoi cells. Intuitively, the displacement at a single iteration depends on the
size of the largest Voronoi cell in a current working set. Although it is hard to derive a
precise estimate on the latter, the following “average-case” argument sheds some light on
the attack’s behavior, especially since it is the average-case geometry of the working set
that determines the overall – as opposed to a single iteration – attack progress.
Consider a simplified case where each of the Voronoi cells Cj constitutes a ball of radius
r centered at a data point xj , j = 1, . . . , n. Clearly, the greedy attack will results in a
progress of r/n (we will move one of the points by r but the center’s displacement will be
discounted by 1/n). We will now use the relationships between the volumes of balls in Rd
to relate r, R and d.
The volume of each Voronoi cell Cj is given by
Vol(Cj) =
pi
d
2 rd
Γ
(
d
2 + 1
) .
Likewise, the volume of the hypersphere S of radius R is
Vol(S) =
pi
d
2Rd
Γ
(
d
2 + 1
) .
Assuming that the Voronoi cells are “tightly packed” in S, we obtain
Vol(S) ≈ nVol(Cj).
Hence we conclude that
r ≈ d
√
1
n
R.
One can see that the attacker’s gain, approximately represented by the cell radius r, is a
constant fraction of the threshold R, which explains the linear progress of the poisoning
attack. The slope of this linear dependence is controlled by two opposing factors: the size
of the training data decreases the attack speed whereas the intrinsic dimensionality of the
feature space increases it. Both factors depend on fixed parameters of the learning problem
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and cannot be controlled by an algorithm. In the limit, when d approaches n (the effective
dimension is limited by the training data set according to Th. 16) the attack progress rate
is approximately described by the function n
√
1
n which approaches 1 with increasing n.
B.2 Proofs of Section 5
Proposition 17 (Geometric series) Let (s)i∈N0 be a sequence of real numbers satisfying
s0 = 0 and si+1 = qsi + p (or si+1 ≤ qsi + p or si+1 ≥ qsi + p ) for some p, q > 0 .
Then it holds:
si = p
1− qi
1− q , (and si ≤ p
1− qi
1− q orsi ≥ p
1− qi
1− q ) , (21)
respectively.
Proof
(a) We prove part (a) of the theorem by induction over i ∈ N0, the case of i = 0 being
obvious.
In the inductive step we show that if Eq. (21) holds for an arbitrary fixed i it also holds
for i+ 1:
si+1 = qsi + p = q
(
p
1− qi
1− q
)
+ p = p
(
q
1− qi
1− q + 1
)
= p
(
q − qi+1 + 1− q
1− q
)
= p
(
1− qi+1
1− q
)
.
(b) The proof of part (b) is analogous.
Proof of Th. 9(b) Multiplying both sides of Eq. (15) with a and substituting Di = Xi ·a
results in
Di+1 =
(
1− 1−Bi
n
)
Di +
Bi
n
+
(1−Bi)
n
i · a .
Inserting B2i = Bi and Bi(1−Bi) = 0, which holds because Bi is Bernoulli, into the latter
equation, we have:
D2i+1 =
(
1− 21−Bi
n
+
1−Bi
n2
)
D2i +
Bi
n2
+
(1−Bi)
n2
‖i·a‖2+2Bi
n
Di+2(1−Bi)(1− 1
n
)Dii·a .
Taking the expectation on the latter equation, and noting that by Axiom 6 i and Di are
independent, we have:
E
(
D2i+1
)
=
(
1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
))
E
(
D2i
)
+ 2
ν
n
E(Di) +
ν
n2
+
1− ν
n2
E(‖i · a‖2)
(1)
≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
))
E
(
D2i
)
+ 2
ν
n
E(Di) +
1
n2
(22)
where (1) holds because by Axiom 6 we have ‖i‖2 ≤ r and by Def. 7 ‖a‖ = R, R = 1.
Inserting the result of (a) in the latter equation results in the following recursive formula:
E
(
D2i+1
) ≤ (1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
))
E
(
D2i
)
+ 2(1− ci)ν
n
ν
1− ν +
1
n2
.
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By the formula of the geometric series, i.e., by Prop.17, we have:
E
(
D2i
) ≤ (2(1− ci)ν
n
ν
1− ν +
1
n2
)
1− di
1−ν
n
(
2− 1n
) ,
denoting di :=
(
1− 1−νn
(
2− 1n
))i
. Furthermore by some algebra
E
(
D2i
) ≤ (1− ci)(1− di)
1− 12n
ν2
(1− ν)2 +
1− di
(2n− 1)(1− ν) . (23)
We will need the auxiliary formula
(1− ci)(1− di)
1− 12n
− (1− ci)2 ≤ 1
2n− 1 + ci − di , (24)
which can be verified by some more algebra and employing di < ci. We finally conclude
Var(Di) = E(D
2
i )− (E(Di))2
Th.13(a); Eq.(23)
≤
(
(1− ci)(1− di)
1− 12n
− (1− ci)2
)(
ν
1− ν
)2
+
1− di
(2n− 1)(1− ν)2
Eq.(24)
≤ γi
(
ν
1− ν
)2
+ δn
where γi := ci − di and δn := ν
2+(1−di)
(2n−1)(1−ν)2 . This completes the proof.
B.3 Proofs of Section 6
Lemma 18 Let C be a protected online centroid learner satisfying the optimal attack strat-
egy. Then we have:
(a) 0 ≤ E (I{‖i−Xi‖>r}Dqi ) ≤ αE(Dqi ) , q = 1, 2
(b) 0 ≤ E (I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}i) ≤ α
(c) E
(
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}iDi
) ≤ αE(Di) .
Proof
(a) Let q = 1 or q = 2. Since i is independent of Xi (and hence of Di), we have
Ei
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}D
q
i
)
= (Di)
qEi
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}
)
.
Hence by Ax. 11
Ei
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}D
q
i
)
= 0 if e(Xi) := Ei
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}
)
> α,
and
0 ≤ Ei
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}D
q
i
) ≤ α if e(Xi) ≤ α.
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By the symmetry of i we conclude statement (a).
Taking the full expectation E = EXiEi on the latter expression yields the statement.
(b) We denote I≤ := I{‖i−Xi‖≤r} and I> := I{‖i−Xi‖>r}. Since it holds
E(I≤i) + E(I>i) = E ((I≤ + I>) i) = E(i) = 0 ,
we conclude
E(I≤i) = −E(I>i) = E(I>(−i))
(1)
≤ α ,
where (1) holds because ||i|| ≤ 1 and by Ax. 11 we have E(I>) ≤ α.
Furthermore E(I≤i) ≥ 0 is clear.
(c) The proof of (c) is analogous to that of (a) and (b).
Proof of Th. 13
(a) By Ax. 11 we have
Di+1 = max
(
0, Di +
1
n
(
Bi (f(Xi)−Xi) + (1−Bi)I{‖i−Xi‖≤r} (i −Xi)
) · a) . (25)
By Prop. 12 an optimal attack strategy can be defined by
f(x) = x+ a .
Inserting the latter equation into Eq. (25), using Di
Def.
= Xi · a, and taking the expectation,
we have
E(Di+1) = E
(
max
(
0, Di +
1
n
(
Bi + (1−Bi)I{‖i−Xi‖≤r} (i −Di)
)))
, (26)
denoting i = i · a. By the symmetry of i the expectation can be moved inside the
maximum, hence the latter equation can be rewritten as
E(Di+1) ≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
)
E(Di) +
ν
n
(27)
+
1− ν
n
(
E
(
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}Di
)
+ E
(
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}i
))
.
Inserting the inequalities (a) and (b) of Lemma 18 into the above equation results in:
E(Di+1) ≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
)
E(Di) +
ν
n
+
1− ν
n
(αE(Di) + α)
=
(
1− (1− ν)(1− α)
n
)
E(Di) +
ν + α(1− ν)
n
.
By the formula of the geometric series, i.e., Prop. 17, we have
E(Di+1) ≤ (1− ci) ν + α(1− ν)
(1− ν)(1− α) (28)
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where ci =
(
1− (1−ν)(1−α)n
)i
. Moreover we have
E(Di+1) ≥ (1− bi) ν
1− ν , (29)
where bi =
(
1− 1−νn
)i
, by analogous reasoning. In a sketch we show that by starting at
Eq. (26), and subsequently applying Jensen’s inequality, the lower bounds of Lemma 18 and
the formula of the geometric series. Since bi ≤ ci we conclude
E(Di+1) ≥ (1− ci) ν
1− ν . (30)
(b) Rearranging terms in Eq. (25), we have
Di+1 ≤ max
(
0,
(
1− 1−Bi
n
)
Di +
Bi
n
+
1−Bi
n
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}i
+
1−Bi
n
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}Di
)
Squaring the latter equation at both sides and using that Di, I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}, and I{‖i−Xi‖>r}
are binary-valued, yields
D2i+1 ≤
(
1− 1−Bi
n
(
2− 1
n
)
)
)
D2i + 2
Bi
n
Di +
(
1−Bi
n
(
2− 1
n
))
I{‖i−Xi‖>r}Di
+2
1−Bi
n
(
1− 1
n
)
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}iDi +
1−Bi
n2
I{‖i−Xi‖≤r}
2
i +
Bi
n2
.
Taking expectation on the above equation, by Lemma 18, we have
E(D2i+1) ≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
)(1− α)
))
E(D2i )
+2
(
ν
n
+ α
1− ν
n
(
1− 1
n
))
E(Di) +
ν + (1− ν)E(2i )
n2
.
We are now in an equivalent situation as in the proof of Th. 8, right after Eq. (22).
Similary, we insert the result of (a) into the above equation, obtaining
E(D2i+1) ≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
)(1− α)
))
E(D2i )
+2
(
ν
n
+ α
1− ν
n
(
1− 1
n
))
(1− ci) ν + α(1− ν)
(1− ν)(1− α) +
ν + (1− ν)E(2i )
n2
≤
(
1− 1− ν
n
(
2− 1
n
)
(1− α)
)
E(D2i ) + 2(1− ci)
(ν + α(1− ν))2
n(1− ν)(1− α)
+
ν + (1− ν)E(2i )
n2
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By the formula of the geometric series we obtain
E(D2i ) ≤
(
2(1− ci) (ν + α(1− ν))
2
n(1− ν)(1− α) +
ν + (1− ν)E(2i )
n2
)
1− di
1−ν
n (2− 1n)(1− α)
≤ (1− ci)(1− di)(ν + α(1− ν))
2
(1− 12n)(1− ν)2(1− α)2
+
(1− di)(ν + (1− ν)E(2i ))
(2n− 1)(1− ν)(1− α) , (31)
where di =
(
1− 1−νn (2− 1n)(1− α)
)i
. We finally conclude
Var(Di) = E(D
2
i )− (E(Di))2
(30),(31)
≤ (1− ci)(1− di)(ν + α(1− ν))
2
(1− 12n)(1− ν)2(1− α)2
+
(1− di)(ν + (1− ν)E(2i ))
(2n− 1)(1− ν)(1− α) − (1− ci)
2 ν
2
(1− ν)2
(1)
≤ γi ν
2
(1− α)2(1− ν)2 + ρ(α) + δn
defining γi = ci−di, ρ(α) = α (1−ci)(1−di)(2ν(1−α)+α)(1− 1
2n
)(1−ν)2(1−α)2 , and δn =
(1−di)(ν+(1−ν)E(2i ))
(2n−1)(1−ν)(1−α) , where
(1) can be verified employing some algebra and using the auxiliary formula Eq. (24), which
holds for all 0 < di < ci < 1. This completes the proof of (b).
Statements (c) and (d) are easily derived from (a) and (b) by noting hat 0 ≤ ci < 1,
ci → 1 for i→∞ and δ(n)→ 0 for n→∞. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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